Preserving Cherokee Village Amenities:

A Critical Examination of Strategies

for Sustainable Stewardship

A balanced policy analysis that presents nine possible/proposed strategies—some compelling, others less advisable, to guide thoughtful discussion on safeguarding, maintaining, and revitalizing Cherokee Village's amenities for the long-term benefit of all property owners.

Summary: Purpose of the Paper

Cherokee Village faces complex choices about how to safeguard its lakes, golf courses, recreation centers, and other shared amenities, and these nine ideas are presented as a structured set of options, some promising and some problematic. I have carefully examined each through over 3 years of focused research into the SID, the 2021 settlement, and Arkansas law on suburban improvement districts and related entities. Each numbered idea represents a different path, ranging from POA/HOA conversion to legislative reform, city transfer, new assessments or fees, targeted levies or bonds, reassessment strategies, and even the high-risk choice of doing nothing. So the value here is not in claiming to have every answer, but in offering clear, reasoned conclusions about the pros, cons, and long-term implications of each one for property owners’ financial stability and the preservation of community amenities.

These nine strategies are starting points for informed community discussion, tested against practical realities such as legal constraints, funding mechanisms, operational control, and the need for long-term sustainability. Some approaches emerge as more viable than others, yet even the less advisable options are worth examining because they clarify what risks and unintended consequences Cherokee Village must avoid in order to protect the integrity and value of its shared assets.

After carefully weighing all nine strategies, the strongest, most fiscally conservative path for Cherokee Village property owners I believe is to keep the SID intact while modernizing how it operates. The SID model keeps amenity costs tied to those who benefit most, uses a leaner staffing and benefits structure than a full municipal parks department, and avoids shifting high, resort-style expenses onto the entire city tax base through millage or sales tax increases. Updating the SID’s assessment methods, benefit categories, and governance practices in light of the Kronkosky settlement can correct past weaknesses without sacrificing the limited-purpose, owner‑focused framework that has historically protected both amenity quality and property values. In short, preserving and improving the SID—rather than dissolving it or transferring everything to the City—offers the best chance to sustain lakes, golf courses, and parks responsibly while keeping long‑term costs predictable for property owners.

This thoughtful analysis shows a proven willingness that I do the hard work required—digging into legal details, financial consequences, and governance structures—to protect all Cherokee Village property owners over the long term, and it is in that spirit of diligent, informed stewardship that this candidacy is offered. While no one can claim to possess every answer in a situation this complex, my commitment to rigorous research and transparent evaluation demonstrates the kind of hardworking board member I will be and that Cherokee Village deserves, and this is a direct request for your vote so that this type of work can continue on your behalf as a member of the board.

Nine possible ideas submitted for discussion (in no particular order):

1. Reassess amenities in effort to extend life of assessment.

2. Create new funding streams by establishing a new SID fee structure (i.e. recreational fee or Property owner fee).

3. Approach the Arkansas Legislature to modify Arkansas Code governing suburban improvement districts in ways that ensure SIDs have the necessary protections needed to maintain financial solvency.

4. Create a Property Owners Association (POA) or Home Owners Association (HOA)., dissolve current SID and gift amenities to new POA or HOA.

5. Create a new improvement district with a new assessment, dissolve current SID and gift amenities to new improvement district (SID).

6. Seek to overturn settlement related specifically to assessment.

7. Dissolve SID and transfer amenities and assets to the City.

8. Create specific levies and/or seek bonds to fund specific improvements.

9. Do nothing and let the 2021 settlement play out.

1. Reassess amenities in effort to extend life of assessment.

Reassessing and extending the SID assessment is more fiscally conservative and stable for Cherokee Village property owners than dissolving the SID and turning all amenities over to the City. Placing lakes, golf courses, pools, and parks inside a full municipal Parks & Recreation department would almost certainly raise long‑term costs for taxpayers because of Arkansas municipal staffing, benefit, and compliance standards.

Kronkosky, the SID, and long‑term risk

The Kronkosky class action and 2021 settlement exposed real weaknesses in how the 2018 reassessment was structured and communicated, and it forced the SID and the City to accept legal and financial constraints going forward. Those constraints include tighter rules on how assessments are calculated, clearer benefit categories for different types of lots, and greater scrutiny of any transfers of SID funds to the City, all of which limit the SID’s flexibility but also protect owners from the most aggressive forms of reassessment.

Over time, this means the SID must operate in a narrower legal lane, but it also has a clearer, court‑tested framework for assessments and benefits, which is something a city Parks & Recreation department does not automatically gain by inheriting all amenities. If Cherokee Village reacts to Kronkosky by abandoning the SID model altogether and dumping the amenities into the City’s structure, it would be trading a specialized, benefit‑based system for a much more expensive, tax‑funded one.

Why a municipal takeover is structurally expensive

A Suburban Improvement District is designed to fund only defined improvements within its boundaries, using assessments tied to property that directly benefits. It has limited staff, narrow purposes, and more flexibility on how it hires and compensates employees, which allows it to run lakes, golf courses, and parks with a leaner cost structure than a city department.

By contrast, once amenities are transferred to the City, they must be operated under municipal rules, including participation in state‑recognized retirement systems like APERS, health plans such as the Municipal Health Benefit Fund, and standardized leave and benefit policies promoted through the Arkansas Municipal League. Even if Cherokee Village is small, municipal practice across Arkansas shows that full‑time city employees typically receive higher benefit packages and more rigid job classifications than SID or POA employees, which drives up the cost of every hour of mowing, lifeguarding, golf‑shop staffing, and lake maintenance.

Added taxpayer exposure under Arkansas municipal norms

Once the City owns the amenities, their operating deficits, capital repairs, and staffing costs become part of the municipal budget, backed by general city taxes instead of targeted SID assessments. That means non‑amenity users and owners of modest interior lots would be asked to subsidize resort‑style facilities through city millage, sales tax, or fees, even if they rarely use the lakes or golf courses.

Municipal ownership also tends to expand regulatory and liability exposure: city‑run pools and parks trigger higher training, insurance, and compliance costs, and in time voters expect additional services such as longer operating seasons, more staff, and facility upgrades, all of which flow through the city budget instead of a self‑contained improvement district. If revenue lags or major repairs hit, the City has little choice but to raise taxes, cut other services, or both, tying the fate of core municipal functions to discretionary amenities in a way that is risky for long‑term fiscal soundness.

Why reassessing amenities and extending the SID is smarter

Reassessing amenity values within the existing SID framework, with stricter statutory guardrails post‑Kronkosky, allows Cherokee Village to reset the assessment schedule while keeping costs tied to those who benefit most from the amenities. A carefully structured reassessment can extend the life of the assessment at sustainable levels, rather than front‑loading a decade of payments in a way that misleads owners into thinking the SID will disappear when the legal authority to reassess still exists.

Using the SID’s ability to adopt different rates for interior, view, and waterfront lots keeps the funding model proportional to the market value and amenity benefit of each property class, which is much harder to achieve inside a city‑wide tax system. This approach maintains a direct link between amenity quality and SID assessment decisions, preserving property values while avoiding the across‑the‑board tax hikes that a city Parks & Recreation department would likely require over time.

Protecting owners through limited‑purpose governance

Keeping the SID in place, and perhaps refining it or pairing it with a future POA, keeps amenity governance in a limited‑purpose, owner‑focused body instead of embedding it in the broader municipal bureaucracy. In the SID model, commissioners and, in any companion POA, board members remain directly accountable to property owners for how much they assess, which amenities they prioritize, and how they manage reserves and capital projects.

This separation allows the City to focus on essential services—roads, fire protection, law enforcement, code enforcement, drainage—while the SID or a successor owner‑controlled entity concentrates on lakes, golf courses, pools, and parks. That division of labor, which mirrors successful Arkansas resort communities, is more likely to produce stable taxes, predictable amenity costs, and a community of owners who feel they have a direct voice in the assets that define Cherokee Village.

Why a full transfer to the City is a bad deal

Turning all amenities over to the City effectively socializes specialized, discretionary costs onto the entire tax base, while locking those costs into higher municipal standards for pay, benefits, and staffing. Over time, that is a bad deal for Cherokee Village property owners because it reduces flexibility, increases long‑term pension and benefit obligations, and exposes core city services to the financial ups and downs of golf, recreation, and lake operations.

In contrast, reassessing amenities inside the SID and extending the life of the SID assessment keeps costs targeted, preserves owner control, and uses the post‑Kronkosky legal framework to provide clearer, more defensible assessments that can stand the test of time. For both the fiscal soundness of the City and the long‑term interests of Cherokee Village property owners, strengthening and adjusting the SID model—not dissolving it and transferring everything to the municipality—is the more cautious, fiscally sound path.

2. Create new funding streams by establishing a new SID fee structure (i.e. recreational fee or Property owner fee).

Creating new, clearly defined SID-based funding streams for amenities is more fiscally conservative and predictable for Cherokee Village property owners than dissolving the SID and placing all lakes, golf courses, pools, parks, and recreation facilities inside a full municipal Parks & Recreation structure. Doing that kind of full municipal transfer would expose the City—and therefore every taxpayer—to higher ongoing personnel, benefit, and compliance costs shaped by Arkansas public‑sector and Municipal League norms, while also mixing discretionary resort‑style amenities into the same tax base that must fund essential services.

Kronkosky, legal risk, and long‑run stability

The Kronkosky class action showed that when a SID’s assessment structure is not tightly grounded in statute and clearly communicated, the result can be large, unexpected legal exposure for both the SID and the City. The 2018 reassessment and subsequent 2021 settlement forced Cherokee Village SID and the City to defend basic questions about how assessments were calculated, what improvements were being funded, and whether SID monies were being used for strictly authorized purposes, including alleged transfers related to city streets.

Instead of taking that episode as a reason to abandon the SID model, a more logical response is to tighten and modernize the SID’s assessment and governance framework so future reassessments are transparent, legally defensible, and clearly tied to amenity benefits, which reduces the odds of another large, system‑shaking lawsuit.

Why a municipal takeover is structurally expensive

Arkansas law lets suburban improvement districts be formed specifically to build and maintain defined improvements such as parks, lakes, and golf courses, funded by benefit‑based assessments on the properties that gain from those improvements. The SID structure is narrow, mission‑specific, and does not automatically drag every employee into broader municipal pay and retirement systems.

By contrast, when amenities become full municipal departments, personnel often fall under statewide or pooled retirement programs such as APERS and into a benefit environment that the Arkansas Municipal League actively works to strengthen and protect, which raises required employer contributions over time. Those obligations are structurally hard to reduce once incurred, meaning that if Cherokee Village took all amenities into the City, the long‑term cost of every greenskeeper, lifeguard, parks worker, and supervisor would tend to rise faster and be harder to adjust than under a leaner SID staffing model.

Tax base risk for all property owners

Leaving the lakes, golf courses, pools, and recreation centers in the SID allows costs to remain targeted to the properties that actually benefit and keeps amenity spending on a separate, transparent track from core municipal functions. If those same amenities are absorbed into a city Parks & Recreation department, the expenses for specialized equipment, capital upgrades, and year‑round personnel must compete inside the same general fund that pays for police, streets, and other essentials, creating pressure for higher city‑wide millage or new general taxes.

In that scenario, even property owners who rarely or never use the golf courses or lakes could see higher general taxes to cover amenities that used to be funded through focused SID charges, which is politically volatile and fiscally risky for a small city with a limited commercial tax base. Keeping amenity financing inside a separate SID‑style structure shields the City’s basic tax base from volatile recreation costs and makes it easier to show taxpayers that essential services will not be squeezed by discretionary amenity spending.

Why new SID fee streams are more flexible

Arkansas SID statutes already recognize that districts can be created and maintained for parks, lakes, and golf courses, and SIDs like Cherokee Village’s already operate under regulations and fee schedules for use of those facilities. That legal framework can support a revised fee structure—such as dedicated recreational fees, tiered property‑owner charges, and user‑based lake/golf access fees—that better matches actual usage patterns without dragging the City into higher, fixed personnel and pension commitments.

Because SID assessments and user charges are not ad valorem city taxes, they can be calibrated more precisely to amenity needs, adjusted by the SID board with clear public notice, and scaled up or down as conditions change, which is much harder to do once costs are embedded in a municipal department with union‑like expectations and statewide retirement rules. This makes a strengthened SID with modernized fee streams a more adaptable and fiscally sound way to preserve high‑quality amenities while protecting the wider tax base.

Long‑run benefits of keeping amenities in a SID

The amenities in Cherokee Village—two golf courses, seven lakes, recreation centers, parks, and related facilities—were originally deeded to and organized under the SID for a reason: a special‑purpose entity can focus on amenity quality and property values without forcing every municipal taxpayer to permanently underwrite resort‑style infrastructure. The Kronkosky litigation highlighted weaknesses in how assessments were structured and communicated, but it did not change the core reality that SIDs remain the tool the Arkansas Code provides for targeted funding of parks, lakes, and golf courses.

Rebuilding Cherokee Village’s SID around a clearer, more diversified amenity fee structure—rather than dissolving it and handing all assets to the City—keeps decision‑making closer to the property owners who are directly affected, preserves a narrower and more controllable cost structure, and avoids binding the City to escalating long‑term personnel and pension obligations for discretionary amenities. For property owners and taxpayers, that path is more likely to preserve both amenity quality and fiscal soundness over the coming decades than a wholesale municipal takeover of every lake, golf course, pool, and park.

3. Approach the Arkansas Legislature to modify Arkansas Code governing suburban improvement districts in ways that ensure SIDs have the necessary protections needed to maintain financial solvency.

The Kronkosky lawsuit and 2021 settlement exposed serious weaknesses in how Cherokee Village SID handled assessments and legal risk, but those same events also show why strengthening Arkansas SID law is a more fiscally conservative solution for property owners than dismantling the SID or handing all amenities to the City. The better long‑term path is to shore up SID governance and protections in state statute so the SID model can keep funding lakes, golf courses, pools, parks, and related infrastructure without pushing those costs into a full‑blown municipal Parks & Recreation department built to Arkansas Municipal League standards.

Kronkosky and fiscal risk

The Kronkosky class‑action focused on the 2018 reassessment of benefits and alleged that the SID’s assessment structure and dealings over delinquent taxes and lots were improper, forcing a global settlement approved in 2021 that required changes in how assessments and collections are handled. That settlement consumed legal fees, staff time, and public trust, and it put every future financing decision under a brighter legal and political spotlight, increasing the risk and cost of missteps for both the City and the SID. In other words, Kronkosky did not just resolve past issues; it permanently raised the stakes of getting SID governance wrong, which is exactly why clearer, stronger statutory rules and protections are needed.

Why a city Parks & Rec takeover is costly

A Suburban Improvement District is a narrow, project‑focused entity designed to fund specific improvements through assessments, while a municipal Parks & Recreation department must “live inside” the larger city structure, with personnel, benefits, and compliance expectations shaped in part by Arkansas Municipal League‑informed policies and insurance standards. Once lakes, golf courses, pools, and parks move under the city umbrella, the city typically has to apply municipal‑level pay scales, health and dental benefits (often via Arkansas Municipal League programs), and retirement offerings to amenity staff, which drives up the cost of every greenskeeper, lifeguard, and maintenance worker hour. That heavier cost structure is much harder to dial back, and it turns resort‑style amenities into a permanent obligation of the general tax base.

Structural differences: SID law vs city rules

Under Arkansas law, SIDs fund improvements through benefit‑based assessments tied to property within the district, and the amenities in Cherokee Village—two golf courses, seven lakes, recreation centers, and parks—were originally deeded to the SID specifically for that purpose. The SID structure allows more flexibility in staffing, contracting, and capital planning than a city department bound by civil‑service‑style procedures, city‑wide personnel manuals, and Arkansas Municipal League‑driven benefit and liability frameworks. When amenities sit inside the SID, their costs are more directly and transparently linked to the properties that benefit, instead of being buried in general municipal budgets and spread across every taxpayer whether they use the amenities or not.

Why state‑level SID reforms are wiser

Approaching the Arkansas Legislature to refine SID statutes can directly address the weaknesses revealed by Kronkosky—such as transparency in reassessments, safeguards on SID–developer arrangements, clearer notice and appeal rights for property owners, and tighter rules on how delinquent taxes and foreclosures are handled. The Legislature can also clarify commissioner duties, conflict‑of‑interest rules, and fiscal reporting standards so that SIDs like Cherokee Village’s operate with more accountability and less legal ambiguity, reducing the chance of another class‑action that drains resources. Strengthening the SID code preserves the basic benefit‑district model while hard‑wiring protections that keep both assessments and governance on a sound, legally defensible footing.

Long‑run burden on taxpayers if city takes amenities

If Cherokee Village dissolved its SID and the voters shifted all lakes, golf courses, pools, and parks to the City, the municipality would likely need to create or greatly expand a Parks & Recreation department with directors, supervisors, programmers, lifeguards, maintenance crews, and administrative staff that align with statewide municipal practice. Those positions generally come with Municipal League‑linked health, dental, and retirement benefits, and they must be supported by long‑term facility maintenance, ADA compliance, and risk‑management standards, which together could require higher millage rates or new city‑level fees to keep the system solvent. In practical terms, that means property owners would trade a targeted SID assessment—where the amenity costs are relatively contained—for open‑ended municipal obligations that are politically difficult to cut once they exist.

Why legislative SID protections are better for Cherokee Village

Keeping the amenities in a reformed, better‑protected SID lets Cherokee Village continue using a tool explicitly designed in Arkansas law to handle exactly these kinds of improvements, instead of forcing a small city into a big‑city Parks & Recreation footprint it cannot comfortably afford. Legislative changes that clarify SID authority, tighten financial controls, and protect assessments from the kinds of disputes seen in Kronkosky can restore confidence in the SID model, maintain owner‑focused governance of amenities, and shield the municipal tax base from escalating pension, benefit, and staffing obligations. For Cherokee Village property owners and taxpayers, that path—reforming and protecting the SID through the Legislature, rather than turning everything over to the City—offers a more predictable, transparent, and fiscally sound way to preserve the lakes, golf courses, pools, and parks that define the community.

4. Create a Property Owners Association (POA) or Home Owners Association (HOA)., dissolve current SID and gift amenities to new POA or HOA.

In resort and retirement communities across Arkansas, a property owners’ association (POA) or similar owner‑controlled entity has proven to be a durable way to manage amenities like lakes, golf courses, marinas, pools, and parks. Communities such as Hot Springs Village, Fairfield Bay, Bella Vista, and Holiday Island have long relied on POA‑style governance to keep control of core amenities in the hands of property owners rather than transferring everything to a city government. That basic model—owners electing boards, funding amenities through assessments and user fees, and setting policies by covenant—has generally aligned costs, control, and benefits with those who depend on the amenities for quality of life and property values.

When a POA owns the amenities instead of a city, property owners directly decide how much to invest in golf courses, lake quality, recreation centers, and trails, and they can tailor assessments to match the expectations of the community. In Hot Springs Village and Fairfield Bay, this has meant that major capital projects—such as clubhouse renovations, lake repairs, or trail expansions—are debated and approved within the owner community rather than at a city council meeting where many voters may never use those facilities. Over time, that structure has helped preserve a resort‑style environment and given owners a clear, organized way to protect what they bought into: a lifestyle community with well‑maintained amenities, not just a generic town.

Bella Vista and Holiday Island show how owner‑based governance can even coexist with municipal structures while keeping POA control over key amenities. Where incorporation has occurred or been considered, the POA typically continues to own and operate golf courses, lakes, marinas, and recreation centers, leaving the city to handle core public services like police, streets, and statutory obligations. Property owners in those communities generally remain supportive of the POA arrangement because they see a direct link between their dues and the condition of the amenities they use and rely on to sustain property values, instead of watching amenity funding compete in a municipal budget against unrelated citywide needs.

Property owners in successful POA‑oriented communities tend to be satisfied with the model because it gives them a strong voice and a clear governance channel. They elect boards from among their neighbors, can recall or replace directors, and can vote on covenants, assessment changes, or major capital plans, which creates accountability that is more specific than broad municipal elections. This sense of ownership—both financial and political—helps sustain volunteerism, committee work, and long‑term planning in a way that often does not happen when amenities are just another department in city government.

By contrast, the experience with the Municipal Recreational Improvement District (MRID) in Horseshoe Bend is frequently cited as a cautionary example of how a special district can struggle when governance is diffuse and the financial structure is not closely aligned with owner expectations. Reports from that community describe dissatisfaction with transparency, questions about how funds were allocated, and tension over the condition and viability of certain amenities under MRID management. Rather than generating a strong sense of owner control and buy‑in, the MRID has often been portrayed as an example of what happens when a quasi‑public entity owns amenities but is not as directly accountable to property owners as a POA board that lives and dies by owner elections and covenants.

For Cherokee Village, dissolving the suburban improvement district and transferring the amenities to a new POA—rather than giving everything to the city—can be framed as an effort to follow the more successful Arkansas resort‑community pattern instead of the MRID model. A POA can adopt covenants, dues structures, and capital‑reserve policies that mirror what has worked in Hot Springs Village, Bella Vista, Fairfield Bay, and Holiday Island, while deliberately avoiding pitfalls seen in Horseshoe Bend, such as unclear lines of accountability or overreliance on a tax‑like mechanism that owners feel they cannot control. That gives Cherokee Village property owners a familiar, tested framework rather than an experiment in full municipal takeover of amenities.

In the long run, a strong POA in Cherokee Village would be expected to bring more consistent funding and higher standards for amenities, which often attracts buyers who are committed to maintaining their properties and supporting the community’s long‑term plan. The reality is that robust amenities and well‑funded reserves typically involve higher assessments and user fees than a bare‑bones, tax‑only model, and that can gradually shift the resident mix toward owners who are both willing and able to invest in the community’s quality. Professionally, this can be described as encouraging a more stable base of owners with a long‑term outlook, which supports strong property values and predictable governance.

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that a POA‑driven model must be managed carefully so that it emphasizes community standards and long‑term sustainability rather than simply drawing lines between “haves” and “have‑nots.” The message for Cherokee Village can focus on attracting residents who share a common expectation for well‑maintained amenities, orderly governance, and responsible financial participation, without disparaging current owners or those on tighter budgets. Framed this way, the POA is not about excluding people; it is about protecting the shared investment in lakes, golf courses, parks, and infrastructure so that the village remains a high‑functioning, attractive community for decades.

Finally, a POA solution helps keep a clean separation between public governance and lifestyle amenities: the city can focus on core governmental responsibilities, while the POA concentrates on amenities and property‑value protection. Over the long term, this split has allowed Arkansas POA‑based communities to maintain high amenity standards without overburdening municipal budgets, and it has given owners a more predictable, transparent path for funding and governing the features that make their communities unique. For Cherokee Village, the case can be made that following this POA path offers the best chance for stable finances, responsive governance, and a resident base that is deeply invested—financially and civically—in the village’s future.

5. Create a new improvement district with a new assessment, dissolve current SID and gift amenities to new improvement district (new SID).

Creating a new improvement district with a new assessment, dissolving the current SID, and gifting the lakes, golf courses, pools, and parks to that new district is more fiscally sound for Cherokee Village property owners than turning all amenities over to the City. Placing these amenities inside a municipal Parks & Recreation structure would pull them into a much more rigid, benefit‑heavy, and regulation‑dense environment shaped by Arkansas Municipal League–style municipal standards, which almost always drives long‑run personnel and benefit costs higher than a special‑purpose improvement district model.

A Suburban or municipal property owners’ improvement district is designed under Arkansas law as a special‑purpose entity that finances specific improvements—streets, community centers, lakes, golf courses, parks, and trails—through targeted assessments on the benefited real property. The recent Little Rock ordinance forming a Municipal Property Owners’ Multipurpose Improvement District shows how a city can create an improvement district to purchase or accept as a gift amenities and then assess only the property inside that district according to benefit, instead of spreading the burden across the entire municipal tax base. That structure is a very close analog for Cherokee Village: a new amenity‑focused district can legally own and operate the lakes and golf courses funded by a clearly defined assessment on the properties that actually benefit most from them.

If all Cherokee Village amenities are turned over to the City, Parks & Recreation operations would be staffed as municipal employees subject to the full web of state and federal employment and record‑keeping requirements that cities, guided by Arkansas Municipal League materials, are expected to follow. City employees frequently participate in statewide retirement systems such as APERS or comparable municipal plans, which entail mandatory employer contributions on every payroll dollar and create long‑term actuarial and benefit obligations that do not exist in the same way in a lean improvement‑district setting. Over time, these benefit and compliance costs tend to rise faster than inflation, so every hour of maintenance on a green, fairway, lake dam, or pool deck becomes more expensive to taxpayers than it would be in a streamlined improvement district.

By contrast, a new amenity-focused improvement district allows property owners to tailor staffing levels, benefit structures, and departmental organization specifically to golf, lake, and recreation operations instead of fitting into a citywide HR and civil‑service framework. Commissioners in such districts, as seen in other Arkansas SID communities like Holiday Island, have direct authority to manage golf courses, marinas, pools, and parks without having to build a full municipal department around them, which helps avoid unnecessary administrative layers and keeps fixed costs lower. Because the district’s only job is to care for defined improvements, it can right-size personnel and vendor contracts for those amenities without being forced into one-size-fits-all municipal job classifications, step raises, and benefit packages.

Financially, keeping the amenities in a new improvement district also preserves the “benefit-based” funding model instead of shifting everything to broad city taxation. When a district owns the lakes and golf courses, the cost is assessed to the real property that directly benefits, and the board can adjust assessments or user fees with a clear line of sight between what is charged and what is maintained; if the City owns the amenities, any budget shortfall tends to become a general fund problem, which eventually pressures millage rates or city-wide fees for every taxpayer, even those who rarely use the amenities. The improvement district model also makes it easier to finance capital projects (cart paths, irrigation upgrades, lake dredging, pool renovations) through benefit assessments or district-backed bonds instead of competing for scarce municipal capital dollars alongside police, streets, and other essential services.

From a property owner perspective, gifting the amenities from the old SID into a new, modern improvement district with a fresh assessment schedule is therefore a more stable, predictable, and defensible structure than handing everything to City Hall. It keeps the golf courses, lakes, and parks in a dedicated, owner‑focused entity whose sole mission is to maintain and enhance those assets, protects the City from inheriting large long‑term pension and operating liabilities tied to discretionary amenities, and avoids the fiscal and political strain that arises when every city taxpayer is asked to subsidize resort‑style facilities. For Cherokee Village, that means better protection of amenity quality and property values over time without saddling the municipal tax base with the full, ever‑growing cost structure of a Parks & Recreation department built to Arkansas Municipal League–level standards.

6. Seek to overturn settlement related specifically to assessment.

Overturning or narrowing the 2021 Kronkosky settlement as it relates to assessments would likely be more fiscally sound for Cherokee Village property owners than dissolving the SID and shifting all amenities to the city, because it preserves the SID financing model while correcting the most controversial part of the reassessment and levy structure. Turning all lakes, golf courses, pools, and parks over to the city would, in practice, push those ongoing costs into the general municipal structure, where Arkansas municipal finance, employment, and benefit rules make those services more expensive to operate than under a dedicated improvement district.

How the 2018–2021 situation harmed fiscal stability

The 2018 reassessment dramatically increased the assessed “benefits” associated with Cherokee Village amenities and roads, and the SID then imposed a 4.5% levy on that new valuation, well above what owners had been accustomed to under the older 1973 assessment. For many property owners, this translated into annual SID assessments jumping to roughly 153 dollars on unimproved lots and around 333 dollars on improved lots, which came on top of regular county and municipal taxes and created understandable anger about both fairness and affordability.

Because the reassessment assigned a large share of “benefit” to roads that are actually owned by the city, not the SID, owners felt they were being double‑charged for infrastructure that should be on the city’s tax base, not on a special assessment roll. The Kronkosky lawsuit and 2021 settlement addressed these grievances in part, but they also locked the SID and city into a compromise that still rests on the controversial 2018 framework, leaving a long‑run risk that the assessment system remains politically fragile and fiscally unstable.

Why overturning or narrowing the settlement can be fiscally healthier

Seeking to overturn or specifically re‑work the settlement provisions tied to the 2018 assessment of benefits creates an opportunity to reset the SID’s tax base, benefit methodology, and levy rate in a way that property owners and courts can see as more proportionate and tied to actual amenity benefits. A more conservative, transparent reassessment—one that does not over‑allocate value to city‑owned roads and clearly distinguishes amenity benefits—would likely reduce legal exposure and improve predictability of assessments for both the SID and property owners.

A refined settlement or new judicial ruling that clarifies what the SID may legitimately fund (lakes, golf courses, recreation centers, parks, and related amenities) and what must remain on the city side (roads, fire protection, core municipal functions) makes it easier to keep SID finances ring‑fenced and disciplined. That legal clarity, in turn, helps support long‑term bond‑like planning for capital maintenance of amenities without the uncertainty and added overhead that would come with trying to run all of those operations through city hall.

Why shifting amenities to the city is structurally more expensive

The SID model in Arkansas is designed as a lean special‑purpose taxing mechanism: it levies assessments directly on benefited properties and uses those funds almost exclusively for specified improvements and operations inside the district. The city, by contrast, must operate under Arkansas municipal law and the Arkansas Municipal League policy framework, which emphasize broad‑based municipal services, personnel protections, and competitive salary and benefit structures for municipal employees.

If Cherokee Village dissolved the SID and moved the lakes, golf courses, pools, recreation centers, and parks into a full municipal parks and recreation department, those facilities would likely become subject to the same wage, retirement, health benefit, workers’ compensation, and HR policies that govern other city employees. Experience data for park and recreation agencies nationwide show that staffing and benefits are the largest portion of parks budgets, with typical agencies maintaining substantial full‑time equivalent staffing per 10,000 residents, which would push total operating costs up when compared to a slimmer district structure.

Municipal rules vs. improvement district flexibility

Arkansas Municipal League guidance stresses that personnel costs—especially retirement and health benefits—are among the most significant and hard‑to‑control expenses in city government, and that cities should provide “fair” wage and benefit packages in a way that balances employee and employer interests. Once amenities are inside the municipal structure, city leaders face political and legal pressure to offer standardized benefit packages and staffing levels, which limits their flexibility to cut costs when revenues fall or participation at amenities declines.

By contrast, Arkansas law allows improvement districts like CVSID to tailor staffing, outsourcing, and fee structures specifically to the needs of the amenities they manage, including user fees and facility charges documented in SID regulations for access to lakes, golf courses, and recreation centers. That flexibility makes it easier for the SID to match spending to amenity usage and to adjust charges or service levels without the additional layers of municipal civil service rules and city‑wide bargaining expectations that would come with a city parks department.

Why keeping amenities in the SID protects property owners and taxpayers

Keeping the lakes, golf courses, pools, and parks under the SID allows those who benefit most directly—property owners in the district—to continue funding and governing them through a dedicated assessment and fee system, rather than spreading all costs across the entire city tax base. If the city had to absorb those facilities, the likely result would be higher general property taxes or reallocated city revenues, meaning even residents who receive little or no benefit from premium amenities would end up subsidizing their ongoing deficits and capital needs.

Reforming or overturning the 2021 settlement on the assessment issue, instead of collapsing the SID into the city, preserves the core advantage of the SID model—focused, benefit‑based funding—while addressing the legitimate complaints about how the 2018 reassessment was executed. That approach maintains a clear institutional division: the city handles roads and core municipal functions, while the SID retains responsibility for amenities, giving property owners more direct control over amenity costs and shielding taxpayers from the higher, less flexible cost structure that would come with a city‑run parks and recreation system.

7. Dissolve SID and transfer amenities and assets to the City.

Turning all Cherokee Village amenities over to the City and dissolving the SID would almost certainly increase long‑term costs and risk for property owners and taxpayers, largely because a municipal Parks & Recreation structure must meet more rigid personnel, benefit, and compliance standards than a leaner improvement district.

Different legal “models”

A Suburban Improvement District is a special‑purpose taxing entity designed specifically to fund and maintain defined improvements (streets, lakes, golf courses, community centers, parks) within a limited area. It operates under Arkansas improvement district law, which allows focused assessments on benefited property and a narrow mission centered on maintaining those improvements rather than running a full general‑purpose government.

A municipality, by contrast, is a general‑purpose local government and must comply with a broader set of statutory, constitutional, and policy obligations promoted and supported by the Arkansas Municipal League, including personnel policies, retirement practices, recordkeeping, and risk management standards. When a city assumes amenities like lakes, golf courses, and recreation centers, those facilities become part of the city’s overall governmental structure and subject to those municipal expectations and costs.

Personnel, HR, and retirement costs

Municipal employees typically fall under the Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System (APERS) or other state‑sanctioned retirement plans, which are recognized by the Municipal League as one of the most important and expensive benefit obligations a city carries. Retirement rules, disability, early retirement options, and DROP‑style arrangements all impose complex, ongoing employer contribution and administrative responsibilities that are much heavier than what many SIDs currently carry for their workforce.

On top of retirement, Municipal League guidance stresses full compliance with state and federal employment laws, detailed personnel files, FMLA rules, and long‑term record retention for employment and retirement documents. Those HR, payroll, legal, and administrative burdens require more staff time, professional support, and liability coverage, all of which translate into higher ongoing overhead that must ultimately be funded by Cherokee Village taxpayers if the city takes over the lakes, golf courses, pools, and parks.

Structural overhead and required departments

A city‑run Parks & Recreation operation is expected to function as a formal department with directors, supervisors, and staff, supported by city administration, legal counsel, finance, and HR. That structure is very different from a single‑purpose SID whose governing board and small management team are focused only on maintaining amenities and collecting assessments under improvement district statutes.

Once Cherokee Village absorbs these amenities, they must be integrated into the city budget, subject to municipal accounting standards, auditing practices, and statewide policy expectations the Municipal League encourages cities to follow. This inevitably adds layers of process—procurement rules, reporting requirements, employee handbook compliance—that may be reasonable for a city hall, police department, fire department, or street department, but are expensive overhead when grafted onto golf courses, lakes, and recreation centers that the SID already maintains under a simpler legal framework.

Risk, liability, and loss of flexibility

Municipal ownership of high‑risk amenities like golf courses, lakes, pools, and recreation centers increases the city’s overall exposure for accidents, employment claims, ADA compliance, and other liability categories, which the Municipal League emphasizes in its risk‑management materials. To manage that exposure, cities generally must carry broader insurance, adopt more conservative policies, and sometimes avoid flexible operating arrangements that a SID can use, such as targeted contracts, lean seasonal staffing, or faster operational changes.

Improvement districts were created precisely to give communities like Cherokee Village a flexible tool to fund and run amenities without turning everything into a full municipal department. Dissolving the SID and pushing those same facilities into the city structure would mean giving up that flexibility in favor of a more rigid, one‑size‑fits‑all municipal model designed for general government, not for specialized resort‑style amenities.

Taxpayer burden and property‑owner control

Under a SID, assessments are directly tied to property within the district, and the mission is narrowly focused on maintaining the amenities that support property values—lakes, golf courses, community centers, and related infrastructure in Cherokee Village. That model allows costs to be targeted to the benefiting properties, rather than spread across a municipal tax base that also has to fund police, streets, administration, and other city obligations.

If the city takes over all amenities, their operating and capital costs must compete with other municipal priorities in the general fund and may drive pressure for higher city millage, new fees, or cuts in service quality. Property owners would also lose the more direct link between their SID assessments and amenity stewardship, because decisions about golf courses, lakes, and parks would be filtered through broader city politics and Arkansas Municipal League–style policy frameworks, rather than a board dedicated solely to Cherokee Village amenities.

Why dissolution would be a bad deal

For Cherokee Village taxpayers and property owners, dissolving the SID and transferring amenities to the city would trade a specialized, property‑focused improvement district for a more expensive, bureaucracy‑heavy municipal system. The city would be expected to provide APERS‑level retirement, stronger HR and legal compliance, formal departmental structures, and broader risk‑management procedures, all of which increase the cost of every hour worked on the golf courses, lakes, pools, and parks.

That shift would likely mean higher long‑term tax or fee burdens, less nimble management of amenities, and weaker direct control by property owners over the assets that define Cherokee Village’s character and property values. In that sense, keeping the SID in place and resisting a full municipal takeover of amenities is the more fiscally conservative and property‑owner‑friendly choice for Cherokee Village.

8. Create specific levies and/or seek bonds to fund specific improvements.

Creating targeted levies and, where appropriate, amenity‑specific bonds within the SID structure is more fiscally conservative and predictable for Cherokee Village than dissolving the SID and placing all lakes, golf courses, pools, parks, and recreation facilities into a full municipal Parks & Recreation department. The Kronkosky litigation shows that fixing and tightening the SID funding model is safer long‑term than pushing those same costs into the city’s general tax base, where Arkansas Municipal League–style personnel and benefit standards will make them more expensive to carry.

Impact of the Kronkosky case

The Kronkosky lawsuit challenged how the SID reassessed benefits in 2018 and how it levied and used assessments, including transfers of SID money to the City and the original developer. The resulting 2021 settlement forced the SID and the City to unwind parts of that structure, exposed both to “illegal exaction” risk, and made it clear that any future assessment or reassessment has to be narrowly tied to real, demonstrable benefit.

That experience is a warning: if all amenities and their funding are moved inside the City, any future controversy over how lake, golf, or pool dollars are raised and spent hits the entire municipal budget and every city taxpayer, not just SID payers. Keeping the SID as the primary amenity vehicle, but using clearly defined levies or bonds that are carefully documented and benefit‑based, keeps legal disputes and fiscal shocks more contained and preserves the City’s capacity to fund streets, fire, police, and other core services.

Why a municipal takeover costs more

A Suburban Improvement District is a special‑purpose taxing district that exists precisely to fund and maintain defined improvements like streets, lakes, golf courses, community centers, and parks inside a specific area, using assessments on benefited property. It can operate with a leaner staffing model and more flexible compensation than a city department, because it is not required to mirror the pay scales, benefit structures, and programmatic expectations that the Arkansas Municipal League encourages for municipal employees.

When a City builds out a full Parks & Recreation department, the expectation quickly grows toward directors, supervisors, maintenance crews, and specialized recreation staff, with formal wage and benefit packages that the Municipal League itself notes are among the most significant cost drivers for cities. Once lakes, golf courses, and pools are in that structure, their labor, insurance, workers’ compensation, and retirement obligations become permanent parts of the city’s operating budget, and they must be funded through ad valorem taxes or broad‑based fees regardless of whether every taxpayer uses the amenities.

Structural advantages of SID-based levies and bonds

Within Arkansas law, an SID can levy assessments of benefits and, if properly structured and approved, use that revenue stream to secure bonds for specific capital improvements to the amenities it maintains. When those assessments and any bond issues are narrowly drafted—tied to defined projects on the lakes, golf courses, or parks, and backed by thorough benefit findings—they are easier to defend in court and more transparent to property owners than a general municipal tax increase.

Targeted SID levies or amenity‑specific bonds allow property owners to see exactly what they are paying for and over what time horizon, such as a 15‑ or 20‑year bond to rebuild cart paths, dredge a lake, or renovate a pool. Because the SID is a special‑purpose entity, these obligations do not automatically drag up broader city tax rates or force cuts to police, fire, or street budgets when amenity costs spike, which is what can happen if all such obligations sit in a municipal Parks & Rec fund.

Long-run fiscal soundness for owners and city

For the property owners, keeping amenities inside the SID and using specific levies and bonds means the cost of lakes, golf courses, pools, and parks remains focused on those who directly benefit through higher property values and amenity use. For the City, it means avoiding long‑term lock‑in to high, benefit‑rich public employment structures for discretionary facilities, something the Municipal League itself highlights as a central strain on city finances statewide.

If everything is turned over to the City, any future downturn—declining rounds of golf, an expensive dam repair, or new safety mandates at pools—forces hard choices between raising city‑wide taxes or cutting core services, because the amenities and essentials are all competing inside the same general fund. Keeping those risks and capital needs inside the SID, and matching them to clearly scoped levies or bond issues, protects the City’s balance sheet and keeps amenity financing more predictable and controllable for property owners who know exactly what they are underwriting.

Why turning amenities over to the city is a bad idea

Turning all Cherokee Village amenities over to the City would combine the legal and political exposure revealed by Kronkosky with the higher structural costs of a municipal Parks & Recreation department, creating a larger target for tax‑exaction claims and a heavier, less flexible cost base for taxpayers. It would also dilute property‑owner control over lakes, golf courses, and parks by moving decisions from a special‑purpose amenity board into a city council that must juggle many competing priorities and voters who may never use the amenities at all.

By contrast, retaining the SID, tightening its assessment practices in light of Kronkosky, and using specific levies and bonds to tackle defined projects keeps amenity governance close to those most affected while shielding the City’s general tax base from escalating personnel, benefit, and compliance obligations tied to resort‑style facilities. For the long‑term fiscal soundness of both Cherokee Village and its property owners, that SID‑based, project‑specific financing path is more disciplined, more transparent, and less risky than wholesale municipal ownership and operation of every lake, golf course, pool, and park in the Village.

9. Do nothing and let the 2021 settlement play out.

Doing nothing after the Kronkosky lawsuit and 2021 settlement locks Cherokee Village and the SID into a weak, lawsuit‑shaped funding structure that undercuts long‑term revenue for amenities while leaving all of the real costs still sitting on the table. That is fiscally dangerous for both the City and the SID, because lakes, golf courses, pools, and parks do not get cheaper to operate or repair over time, and the settlement did nothing to magically fund their future capital needs. Treating the settlement as a “win” that allows everyone to stand still encourages short‑term, zero‑sum thinking and makes it much harder to rebuild a stable, legally defensible assessment or fee system before the next big repair bill or economic downturn hits.

First, the Kronkosky case directly attacked the way CVSID reassessed and levied its benefits in 2018, and the settlement reflects that the old approach carried real legal risk. If policymakers now refuse to reform and strengthen the SID’s assessment and governance tools, they are essentially accepting a permanently weakened SID that is afraid to use its core statutory powers under Arkansas Code § 14‑92‑219 to build, maintain, and operate recreational facilities. That means fewer dollars available for the very amenities the SID was created to support, even as those assets continue to age and demand more intensive maintenance and periodic reconstruction.

Second, doing nothing ignores that the amenities were deeded to the SID precisely so that a dedicated, special‑purpose district—not the general city tax base—would carry the primary financial load for lakes, golf courses, recreation centers, and related facilities. When the SID backs away from proactive reassessment, capital planning, and legal clean‑up of its funding tools, the result is not “free” amenities; it is deferred maintenance, rising backlog, and growing pressure to shove those costs somewhere else later, often at a much higher price. That neglected backlog is exactly what eventually forces crisis decisions: emergency assessments, sudden fee spikes, or politically driven pushes to dump everything onto the City without a realistic long‑term plan.

Third, turning all amenities over to the City and dissolving the SID would expose every taxpayer to a more rigid and expensive municipal cost structure shaped in part by Arkansas Municipal League expectations and general public‑sector employment law. A full municipal Parks & Recreation department must live with more formal personnel systems, stronger benefit and retirement obligations, tighter workers’ compensation and record‑keeping rules, and higher compliance overhead than a leaner improvement district or owner‑controlled entity. Every additional full‑time equivalent in a city department carries long‑term pension and health‑benefit implications that do not go away when tourism softens, a golf season is bad, or a lake needs dredging at the same time a fire truck needs replacement.

Fourth, a city‑run amenity structure also mixes discretionary resort‑style spending directly into the same tax pot that must fund core municipal services like roads, public safety, and basic administration. When revenue tightens, that sets up a damaging trade‑off: either basic services are squeezed to keep golf courses and multiple lakes open to the same standard, or taxes and fees are raised on everyone, including residents who may not use those amenities. In contrast, a properly reformed SID or future POA‑type entity can target assessments or membership fees to those who benefit most from the amenities, leaving the city’s general fund focused on essential services instead of subsidizing high‑maintenance recreation infrastructure.

Finally, the belief that the 2018 Kronkosky lawsuit and 2021 settlement were “great for taxpayers” rests on a narrow, short‑term view that measures only immediate refunds or reductions, not the long‑term cost of undermining the community’s primary amenity‑funding mechanism. Without new, transparent, and legally solid funding and governance tools to replace what Kronkosky called into question, Cherokee Village drifts toward a future of underfunded lakes and golf courses, falling amenity quality, and eventually lower property values—followed by pressure for an expensive municipal takeover under Arkansas Municipal League–level standards. For property owners who care about both their tax bills and the long‑term health of the Village, the truly conservative path is to fix and modernize the SID or move to a strong POA‑style structure—not to sit still and certainly not to push every amenity into a high‑cost city department.

These are nine ideas. What do I think about all of this?

Now, what do I think? After all of this research, I still believe the best overall path right now for Cherokee Village property owners is to keep the SID intact, update it where needed, and use it as the primary tool for protecting our amenities and property values. The SID’s benefit-based structure can be refined—especially in light of the Kronkosky settlement—to ensure assessments are fair, transparent, and more tightly linked to who actually enjoys the greatest market and lifestyle benefits from lakes, golf courses, and recreation facilities. Strengthening, rather than abandoning, this limited-purpose framework lets us fix past weaknesses while preserving a leaner, more focused governance model than a full city department can offer.

Keeping the SID also preserves a culture of fiscal discipline and operational focus that is hard to replicate inside general municipal government. The SID’s mission is narrow: maintain and improve specified amenities within its boundaries, not manage police, streets, courts, and every other city obligation. That narrow mission naturally restrains mission creep, limits staff bloat, and keeps decisions centered on what is truly necessary to keep lakes clean, fairways maintained, and facilities open—rather than forcing amenities to fight for dollars against essential services in the city’s general fund.

By contrast, putting everything under a city Parks & Recreation department locks property owners into a structurally more expensive model over the long term. Municipal departments in Arkansas typically must participate in state retirement systems, standardized health plans, and more rigid pay, benefit, and compliance frameworks, which drive up the cost of every hour of mowing, lifeguarding, and clubhouse staffing. Once those higher costs are embedded in the city budget, the only tools to keep up are tax increases, cuts to other services, or deferred maintenance, all of which are bad outcomes for property owners who depend on both sound amenities and stable taxes.

There is also a critical governance difference. When amenities remain under a SID (and potentially a future owner-controlled companion entity), decision-makers are directly accountable to property owners for assessment levels, project priorities, and reserve management. Elections and board oversight remain focused on amenity stewardship rather than general city politics, which helps ensure that those with the most at stake in property values and amenity quality retain the strongest voice. Moving everything to the City dilutes that voice by placing amenity decisions in a larger electorate where many voters may not live on, use, or rely on the resort-style assets at all.

In the long run, turning all amenities over to the City is a terrible deal for property owners because it socializes specialized, discretionary costs onto the entire tax base and makes those costs harder to control or reverse. Once amenities are inside a high-cost municipal framework, there is no easy way to unwind the decision if expenses spike or priorities shift. Keeping and modernizing the SID instead preserves flexibility, maintains a clear benefit-cost link, and protects Cherokee Village from tying essential municipal functions to inherently discretionary amenities, which is why—after extensive research and analysis—this SID-focused path is the best, most conservative choice for property owners.

Let's talk about all of this. I am asking for your vote. I can and want to help. I have the time and want what's best for the village. You want what's best for the village. We will work this out, I believe that.